The Battle of Algiers: History Repeating Itself

Hi everyone!

I've been reading a lot lately about the Algerian war for independence from France. I'm nearly finished with Martin Evans' exhaustive (and exhausting) history of the war, "Algeria: France's Undeclared War" published this month by Oxford University Press, and watched Gillo Pontecarvo's classic 1966 film "The Battle of Algiers." What strikes me are the similarities between what took place in Algeria from 1954-1962 and what is going on in the Middle East today.

For those of you who are unfamiliar with the Algerian War, it was waged for the most part by the FLN (the National Liberation Front), based in Tunisia and comprised of Algerian nationalists, against France who had first colonized Algeria in 1830. What began as a series of loosely connected guerilla strikes in the Algerian countryside morphed into better coordinated terrorist attacks in Algiers and other metropolitan areas.

The colonization of Algiers had never been particularly easy for the French. In fact, it wasn't until 1870 when France more-or-less successfully put down initial Algerian resistance. After World War Two, as Britain was divesting itself of its colonial territories and France was facing certain defeat in Indochina, the French government decided it was necessary to reaffirm its presence in Algeria. In fact, they even went so far as to annex the North African country as a district of France, making it as integral a part of the country as, say, Normandy or Brittany.

In its formative days, the Algerian resistance was by no means unified. The dominance of the FLN only came after particularly bloody internecine warfare between the FLN and the ALN (the National Liberation Army) that left many thousands of Algerians and whole towns massacred.

The Battle of Algiers solidified the FLN's central role in the conflict, both from a political as well as military standpoint. It began in 1957 as an eight-day general strike after the French and anti-Muslim European activists bombed a neighborhood in the Casbah, the city's densely populated Arab area, that resulted in the deaths of many innocent men, women, and children. This gave rise to a series of coordinated attacks on French government employees and bomb attacks on public places--restaurants, cafes, and a casino--frequented by the Europeans.

This strategy of terrorism strongly resembles the tactics we have seen--and continue to see--from the likes of al Qaeda, for example. Prior to the Battle of Algiers and its aftermath, most of Algeria's nationalist groups restricted their efforts to combating the French occupying forces. Starting in 1957, however, these tactics changed with the intent of stoking terror in the lives of the European community at large. The attacks on public gathering places were carried out by women who were able to change their appearance enough so that they could pass through checkpoints set up throughout the city that separated the European areas from those inhabited by Algerians. We know from recent history in Iraq and Afghanistan that identical tactics are being used against not only U.S. and coalition forces but on native citizens from opposing religious groups.

Another element that strikes me is France's military response. The French, under the command of General Massu, put together a chart that attempted to breakdown the FLN hierarchy. (The Bush administration did a similar thing with playing cards.) The FLN, much like al Qaeda today, organized themselves into separate sects comprised of a leader and one or two seconds-in-command. These individual sects, while working under the FLN umbrella, were divided to such an extent that one sect simply didn't know 1) from whom their orders were being given and 2) who were actually involved in other parallel sects. This made it extremely difficult for anyone to be traced and captured by the French. Interrogations of captured FLN foot soldiers resulted in very little real information because these foot soldiers were kept in ignorance of the FLN hierarchy-at-large. And, finally, just as in Iraq and Afghanistan, the French occupying forces utilized torture as an integral means of disseminating information.

While the FLN ultimately lost the Battle of Algiers--it would take another 3-4 years of bloody conflict before they won Algerian independence in 1962--where they succeeded was in solidifying native Algerian support, something the French simply failed to do in their subsequent 'winning hearts and minds campaign.'

In the thirty years that ensued from 1962-1992, Algeria enjoyed independence but as time went on and a series of governments--led by resistance leaders Ben Bella, Boumediene, and Mohammed Boudiaf respectively--rose and fell from power, the Algerian people became increasingly disillusioned with the way their country was being run. In 1992, Mohammed Boudiaf cancelled general elections that were poised to be won by a hardline Islamist party, and was promptly assassinated. This led to a devastating civil war between Islamists and more moderate Muslims, the effects of which are still being felt today.

My point in all this is that history really does seem to repeat itself. There is very little difference between the tactics used in Algeria by the FLN in the 1950s and '60s--and the French military response--to those being employed by al Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan and currently the opposition in Libya, Syria, and other countries in the throes of the so-called Arab Spring.

Pontecarvo's film "The Battle of Algiers" plays like a documentary in its look, tone, and overall feel. The experience of watching it today is eerie. Throughout, I found myself thinking that this could easily be a newsreel of Baghdad--albeit shot with a black-and-white camera--or any other country in today's Arab World. As a blueprint for today's Islamic insurgency, it is incredibly prescient and hauntingly relevant.

Ciao.